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N 1975 The Signal Companies, Inc. acquired 50.5% of the common
stock of UOP, Inc. Over the next two years Signal placed its employ-
ees on the board of directors and in management positions of UOP. In
1978 Signal became interested in the possibility of acquiring the remaining
shares of UOP's stock. Two directors of Signal, while sitting on the UOP
board, used UOP documents to prepare a feasibility study exclusively for
the use of Signal to ascertain the viability of such an acquisition. On the
basis of this study Signal rapidly proposed and consummated a cash-out
merger' eliminating the minority shareholders' interests in UOP. A
number of the minority shareholders brought a class action suit alleging
that the majority shareholders had breached the fiduciary duty they owed
to the minority shareholders and that the tender offer was for a grossly
inadequate price per share. The Delaware Chancery Court relied on stan-
dards enunciated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer v. Magnavox
Co. 2 to conclude that no breach of fiduciary duty had occurred and that
the merger had been effectuated for a valid business purpose. The plain-
tiffs appealed the decision to the Delaware Supreme Court. Held, re-
versed: Although an independent business purpose is not required to
support a cash-out merger, the majority shareholders breached their
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by failing to negotiate fairly and
failing to offer a fair price for the acquired shares. Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
I. MERGER RESTRICTIONS PRIOR TO SINGER V MAGNAVOX CO.
Until recent years the evolution of Delaware corporate law3 with respect
1. "Cash-out merger" or "freeze-out" refers to the
use of corporate control vested in the statutory majority of shareholders or the
board of directors to eliminate minority shareholders from the enterprise or to
reduce to relative insignificance their voting power or claims on corporate as-
sets. It implies a purpose to force upon the minority shareholders a change
which is not incidental to any other business goal of the corporation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (5th ed. 1979); see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New
Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987, 988-89 (1974).
2. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
3. The Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery historically influence the ju-
dicial interpretation of other major industrial states. The highly favorable incorporation
laws in Delaware attract many major corporations to the state. As a result the Delaware
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to cash-out mergers was relatively slow. Initially the common law re-
quired stockholder unanimity for corporate structural modifications.4 This
requirement slowly gave way in the face of statutory5 and judicial6 liberal-
ization in major industrial states during the first third of the twentieth cen-
tury, resulting in limited corporate freedom to reorganize or dissolve
without unanimous stockholder consent.7 Guth v. Loft, Inc. 8 is indicative
of the state of Delaware law in 1939. 9 In Guth the Delaware Chancery
Court construed the duties that a director owes to his employer-corpora-
tion and its stockholders.' 0 Loft was a corporation engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of candies, syrups, and beverages. Guth, while a director
of Loft, received and seized an opportunity to acquire the trademark and
patented formula of the National Pepsi-Cola Company. A portion of the
acquisition cost was paid with Loft funds, and most of the subsequent de-
courts address the major corporate law issues from a stance of expertise. Weiss, The Law of
Take Out Mergers. .4 Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 624-26 (1981).
4. This requirement led to rule by the minority, since dissenting shareholders could
deny the majority the opportunity to effect material change in the corporate structure. Id. at
627; see Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50 (1890) (corporate life extension by asset
transfer prevented when one shareholder objected); see also In re Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93
N.E. 522, 524 (1910) (strike suits by shareholders who purchased their shares after disfa-
vored transaction was announced prevented consummation of merger). For a comprehen-
sive review of the developmental stages that lead to Weinberger, see Weiss, supra note 3.
5. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1975 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 901(a)(l)(McKinney 1963); 1927 Ohio Laws 35, §§ 8623-8667; Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in
Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1974); Hill, Consolidation of
Corporations by Sale ofAssets and Distribution of Shares, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 349, 362-64
(1931); Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stock-
holders, 30 MICH. L. REV. 645, 645-46 (1932); Comment, Statutory Merger and Consolidation
ofCorporations, 45 YALE L.J. 105, 112-13 (1935).
6. See, e.g., Beling v. American Tobacco Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 32, 65 A. 725, 728 (Ch. 1907)
(stock for stock merger first allowed under New Jersey statute); Small v. Sullivan, 245 N.Y.
343, 346-48, 157 N.E. 261, 263-64 (1927) (corporate consolidation under then New York
law); Weiss, supra note 3, at 636-37 (cash mergers allowed but courts prevented unfair ex-
changes of stock-plus-appraisal). But see Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461,
143 A. 729, 730 (Ch. 1928) (merger that amounted to a forced sale prevented).
7. Hill, supra note 5, at 355-56; Comment, supra note 5, at 112-13.
8. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
9. Cf. Alpren v. Consolidated Edison Co., 168 Misc. 381, 5 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct.
1938) (representative example of New York law in same period). In .4pren the plaintiff
brought a constitutional challenge against a New York statute that permitted gas and elec-
tric companies to merge with subsidiaries in which they held a 95% or greater interest. Act
of May 28, 1936, ch. 778, § I, 1936 N.Y. Laws 1658 (current.version at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 901(a)(I) (McKinney 1963)). Prior to the enactment of the statute New York law generally
required that the merging corporation own all the stock of the merged corporation. Stock
Corporation Law, ch. 787, § 85, 1923 N.Y. Laws 1377, 1403 (current version at N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 905(a) (McKinney 1963). The court rejected the plaintiff's contention and held
that the amendment of the merger requirements was a matter of public policy within the
province of the legislature to control. 5 N.Y.S.2d at 256. The court emphasized that the
shareholder had no constitutional prerogative to insist that the limits on corporate activity
remain unchanged. Id. at 257. The New York Court of Appeals subsequently made it clear
that the minority shareholder had only "one real ight" to receive the cash value of his
interest upon merger. Beloffv. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561, 564(1949). The shareholder had no right to go along into the merger or to share in its future
benefits. ld at 565.
10. 5 A.2d at 510.
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velopment costs were also financed by Loft. Guth nevertheless claimed
that the Pepsi-Cola property and stock that he had acquired were his indi-
vidually and not Loft's. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chan-
cellor's finding to the contrary." As a preliminary matter, the court held
that corporate directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation
and its shareholders.12 The court stated that this relationship precluded a
director from seizing for personal gain business opportunities presented to
the corporation. 13 The court conceded that corporate officers and directors
are free to engage in an independent, competitive business, but only so
long as that activity does not violate a "legal or moral duty" implicit in the
fiduciary relation that exists between the corporation and the officer or
director.' 4 The fiduciary duty test established in Guth asked whether,
based on all the facts and circumstances, the officer or director had acted
as a conscientious representative of the entire corporate entity.15 This test,
when coupled with the "moral duty" requirement, gave courts broad dis-
cretion in assessing the fairness of a challenged action regardless of
whether the action was within the letter of the statute.16 The court found
that Guth had violated these standards in appropriating the Pepsi-Cola
opportunity to himself by secretly using the money and facilities of Loft,
which were committed to his protection as a director.17 Guth was there-
fore ordered to disgorge all the gains arising from his breach of duty.' 8
The Guth decision is crucial to all later fiduciary duty cases because it
established both the general nature of the duty and the remedy for breach
of that duty.
Although Guth purported to give courts broad discretion in determining
I1. Id. at 515.
12. Id at 510; see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)
(coadventurers "subject to fiduciary duties akin to those of partners"); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325
Pa. 187, 189 A. 320, 324 (1937) (directors and officers have fiduciary relationship with
shareholders).
13. 5 A.2d at 513-15; see also Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107,
412 P.2d 47, 57 (1966) (director or officer may not seize business opportunity presented to
corporation); Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S.2d
651, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (subsidiary entitled to profits from business opportunity belonging
to subsidiary that was seized by parent).
14. 5 A.2d at 514.
15. Id. at 511-12; cf Maclsaac v. Pozzo, 81 Cal. 2d 278, 183 P.2d 910, 914 (1947) (test is
whether opportunity is reasonably the director's); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323
Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522, 529 (1948) (standard is what is fair and equitable).
16. 5 A.2d at 514.
17. Id. at 515. Similarly, Securities and Exchange Commission rule lob-5 protects the
investor from unfair treatment by those with inside information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1983). The United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977), left the remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty to the states. Id. at 478; see Note, Suits
for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1884-98 (1978).
18. 5 A.2d at 508; see also Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 504-06 (Del.
198 1) (expanded remedies available to the cashed-out minority).
19831
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the fairness of a corporate transaction, courts have traditionally been re-
luctant to substitute their business judgment for that of corporate direc-
tors. 19 In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp. 20 the Delaware Supreme
Court reviewed the actions of corporate directors who had granted them-
selves stock options with rights to purchase below market price. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court firmly placed the burden of proving the "utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain" 2' on
directors who act both on their own behalf and as representatives of the
corporation. 22 The court stated that if the shareholders have ratified the
challenged actions, however, it would defer to the directors' business judg-
ment if reasonable men acting in good faith could differ as to the result. 23
This rather restricted standard of review was broadened considerably in
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. 24 In Sterling a group of minority share-
holders of Mayflower brought suit to enjoin its merger into its parent cor-
poration, alleging that the price offered for their shares was inadequate.
The Delaware Supreme Court began by reiterating its holding in Gottlieb
that the burden of establishing the "entire fairness" of the transaction
rested on the parent corporation since it stood on both sides of the transac-
tion.25 The court stated that under this standard "all relevant value factors
must be considered in arriving at a fair value" for the minority's shares. 26
After examining the entire transaction the court concluded that the minor-
ity shareholders had received fair value for their investment under the
Delaware merger statute. 27
19. This reluctance stems in large part from the perceived difficulty in balancing the
many variables that necessarily arise in making any business decision. See Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 76-77 (Sup. Ct. 1950); in re General Realty &
Utils. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6, 15 (Ch. 1947).
20. 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
21. 91 A.2d at 58; see also In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir. 1938) (officer or
director is fiduciary); Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P.2d 423, 426 (1940) (director
acts in fiduciary capacity); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862,
867-68 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (quoting Gottlieb proof of fairness requirement); Forker v.
Brown, 10 Misc. 161, 30 N.Y.S. 827, 829 (1894) (directors are fiduciaries).
22. 91 A.2d at 58; cf. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488, 490-91
(E.D. Pa. 1943) (burden is on minority shareholders to show overreaching by majority in
order to prevent "surge of litigation").
23. 91 A.2d at 58-59; see also Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d
862, 867-68 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (quoting Gottlieb business judgment standard and
wholly approving its rationale).
24. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
25. 93 A.2d at 110.
26. Id at 114.
27. Id at 116-17;cf Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183, 190
(Ch. 1931) (dissenting stockholder must prove abuse of discretion, breach of trust, or malad-
ministration on part of management in order to justify enjoining merger). In David J.
Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971), the court held that the
modern version of the Delaware long-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251
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II. SINGER V MAGNAVOX CO. AND TANZER V INTERNATIONAL
GENERAL INDUSTRIES, INC.
The Delaware law of fiduciary duty between majority and minority
stockholders before 1977 did not inquire into the majority shareholders'
purposes under long28 or short29 form mergers. The law required only that
cashed-out minorities receive reasonable compensation for the elimination
of their interests in the merged corporation.30 The Delaware Supreme
Court altered that requirement in Singer v. Magnovox Co. 31 In 1974 North
American Phillips Corporation acquired 84.1% of Magnavox Company
through a tender offer made by one of its wholly owned subsidiaries.
Thereafter North American created a second tier subsidiary in order to
acquire complete control of Magnavox by forcing the merger of Magnavox
into the subsidiary. North American, as majority shareholder of
Magnavox, 32 voted its shares in favor of a merger under which the
Magnavox minority would receive nine dollars per share or an amount
determined by statutory appraisal. 33 At the time of the merger the
Magnavox stock had a book value of $10.16 per share. The Delaware
Supreme Court conceded that North American had acted completely
within statutory parameters in effectuating the merger, but held that mere
statutory compliance was inadequate. 34 The court held that the defend-
ants, as directors and fellow shareholders of the minority, must also satisfy
(1975), authorized cash-out mergers although the statute contained no special protection for
minority shareholders. Id at 35. The analogous short-form merger statute, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1967), was upheld in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187
A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1975 & Supp. 1982), entitled "Merger or consolida-
tion of domestic corporations," sets forth the requirements for merger or consolidation of
two or more corporations created under the laws of Delaware. The statute requires that the
board of directors and the stockholders of each corporation approve all aspects of the trans-
action, including the form of the resulting entity. Id.
29. Id. § 253 (1975 & Supp. 1982), entitled "Merger of parent corporation and subsidi-
ary or subsidiaries," allows a parent corporation owning 90% or more of each class of out-
standing stock of a subsidiary to employ an abbreviated (short-form) merger procedure, thus
simplifying the consummation of a parent-subsidiary merger. The short-form merger elimi-
nates stockholder approval requirements of § 251 and, in cases of 100% ownership, the filing
of a certificate of ownership and merger with the secretary of state. Id.
30. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977); see also
Weiss, supra note 3, at 658-91 (discussing impact of Singer on all previous fiduciary duty
inquiries); Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REV. 1101,
1104-05 (1978) (court rejected "entire fairness" standard and instead held that shareholder
has a "right in his shares").
31. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1975) requires only majority stockholders' ap-
proval of a proposed merger.
33. Id. § 262 (1975) (as amended 1976). The minority under either alternative would
lose all participation in the Magnavox enterprise and would therefore be cashed-out. The
minority shareholders who did not follow the statutory appraisal option ultimately sued
North American, its subsidiaries, Magnavox, and the board of directors of Magnavox. The
plaintiffs alleged that the merger did not satisfy the business purpose rule, that the price
offered by North American was grossly unfair, and that the defendants had breached a
fiduciary duty toward the minority by offering and approving the terms of the merger.
34. 380 A.2d at 975.
1983]
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the fiduciary duty of "honesty, loyalty, good faith and fairness" that they
owed the corporation in dealings with it.35 The court stated that this addi-
tional requirement was intended to balance the shareholder's interest in
protecting his investment and voting his shares as he desires with a public
policy that favors mergers. 36 The court concluded that a merger for the
sole purpose of eliminating the minority shareholders was inconsistent
with the fiduciary standard it had enunciated and constituted an "abuse of
the corporate process."' 37 The Singer court thus strengthened the business
judgment rule enunciated in Gottlieb by employing fiduciary duty concepts
from nonmerger cases 38 and extended the duty of majority shareholders
established in Sterling.39
The Delaware Supreme Court clarified Singer in Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc. 40 by recognizing a shareholder's right to use his
ownership power for his own best interest, including voting to merge with
another entity.4' Tanzer thus diminished the minority's protection against
a cash-out by acknowledging the value of mergers to the business commu-
nity. Tanzer also held, however, that a merger solely for the purpose of
eliminating the minority was impermissible. 42 The majority must also
show a present, bona fide business reason for the merger in order to obtain
judicial approval of that merger.43 Moreover, the entire transaction must
35. Id at 977 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971);
Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971); Dolese Bros. Co. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157
A.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, 40 Del. 534, 14 A.2d 401 (1940); Guth v.
Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939)).
36. 380 A.2d at 978 (quoting E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 251, at 332 (1972)); see also Note, supra note 30, at 1104-05 (shareholder right to invest-
ment form limited by balancing against greater business purpose).
37. 380 A.2d at 980. The court viewed this conclusion as a natural outgrowth of its
decision in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
38. 380 A.2d at 979; see Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.
1971); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Ch. 1967);
Bennett v. Brevil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236, 239 (Ch. 1953). The above
cases were cited by the Singer court, although none involved fiduciary standards in the con-
text of mergers. The court also cited Pennsylvania Mut. Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter Int'l, Inc.,
No. 75-4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975), reprinted in I DEL. J. CORP. L. 229 (1975). 380 A.2d at
979 n.10. Todhunter denied a merger where use of majority control to cash out the minority
was the only business purpose. I DEL. J. CORP. L. at 229-30.
39. 380 A.2d at 979-80. At least one writer believes Singer strongly protected minority
shareholder rights because the Delaware Supreme Court wanted to demonstrate its strength
and avoid federal corporation statutes. See Note, supra note 30, at 1111-12.
40. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). The plaintiffs in Tanzer were shareholders of Kliklok
Corporation. The defendants were International General Industries, Inc. (IGI), which
owned 81% of Kliklok's stock, and IGI's directors. IGI had created a subsidiary that it
intended to merge with Kliklok. Under the terms of the merger the minority shareholders of
Kliklok would be cashed out and IGI would obtain complete ownership of Kliklok. The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the merger, arguing that its sole purpose was to serve the interests
of the parent, IGI. The chancery court declined to grant the injunction, and the plaintiffs
appealed.
41. d. at 1124.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see In re Reading Co., 551 F. Supp. 1205, 1215-17 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (if primary
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pass the test of "entire fairness" to the minority.44 This standard necessi-
tated an extensive inquiry by reviewing courts into the majority's purpose
for the merger and a corresponding degree of judicial discretion. 45 Fur-
thermore, under the court's broad language the restrictions of Singer and
Tanzer applied to virtually all forms of mergers.4 6
Cases subsequent to Singer and Tanzer closely followed the business
purpose rule.4 7 The inadequacy of the statutory appraisal remedy,48 how-
ever, led the Delaware Supreme Court to expand the remedies available to
wrongfully ousted minority shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.4 9
The court ruled that such shareholders could obtain an accounting, rescis-
sion, or any other equitable remedy available in other contexts for similar
breaches of duty.50 The new remedy structure proved difficult to apply,
however, because the court failed to provide guidelines for the application
of the equitable remedies it had made available.
III. WEINBERGER V UOP, INC.
In 1974 Signal 51 sold one of its subsidiaries for $420 million in cash.
Anxious to invest this surplus, Signal became interested in UOP 52 as a
purpose is to impair minority interest, directors' acts are actionable); The Twenty Seven
Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1039 (D. Md. 1982) (fairness concepts
applied to tender offer).
44. 379 A.2d at 1124 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d
107 (Sup. Ct. 1952)); see Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Del. 1979)
(Tanzer "entire fairness test"). But see Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345,
356 (1977) (rejecting fairness evaluation).
45. 379 A.2d at 1124-25; see also Note, supra note 30, at 1107-08 (court review of "entire
fairness" as well as price and business purpose).
46. Note, supra note 30, at 1110-13. Singer and Tanzer do not differentiate between
mergers that have different purposes. Corporations use mergers to acquire a target corpora-
tion, to go private, or, having gone public during prosperous periods, to buy back their
shares at a discount. Id. at I 110. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Singer-Tanzer
fiduciary and business purpose standards, see Brudney, A Note on "Going Private, " 61 VA. L.
REV. 1019, 1020-21 (1975); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts,
87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1364-76 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 442, 446 (N.D. I11. 1982)
(following lower court decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981),
rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), which had expressly affirmed Singer); Kerregin v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 639, 645 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporate
machinery cannot be used to injure minority shareholder without justification); Roland Int'l
Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979) (unmistakable focus of Singer was on
fiduciary duty and protection of minority shareholders).
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 262 (Supp. 1982).
49. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
50. Id. at 501. Statutory appraisal is available in Delaware by petition, thereby avoid-
ing the time and expense of litigation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982). Although
the Lynch court recognized that a breach of fiduciary duty permits broader remedies than
simple appraisal, it held that the plaintiff was only entitled to the monetary equivalent of
rescission because rescission itself was "not feasible at this late date" in the litigation. 429
A.2d at 505-06.
51. Signal is a diversified publicly held corporation specializing in technical industries.
52. UOP was a diversified publicly held corporation engaged in petroleum and pe-




potential acquisition. After extended negotiations between Signal and
UOP, the parties agreed that Signal would purchase 1,500,000 authorized
but unissued shares of UOP stock at twenty-one dollars per share, contin-
gent on Signal's acquiring 4,300,000 publicly held shares of UOP in a cash
tender offer. In total, Signal would acquire 50.5% of all UOP stock. The
tender offer was approved by the board of directors of both companies in
April 1975, and was greatly oversubscribed. 53 Signal, however, purchased
only enough UOP stock to achieve its goal of 50.5% control, As majority
shareholder Signal placed six directors54 on the UOP board. 55 A year later
the UOP president and chief executive officer retired and Signal placed
James V. Crawford at the head of UOP.56
After several years of unsuccessfully searching for other investment op-
portunities, Signal decided to investigate the profitability of acquiring
complete control of UOP. Signal's board chairman, William W. Walkup,
and president, Forrest N. Shumway, initiated a feasibility study that was
performed by Charles S. Arledge 57 and Andrew J. Chitiea,58 employees of
Signal and members of the UOP board. The Arledge-Chitiea report,
which was prepared using information available to its authors as UOP
board members, concluded that acquisition of the UOP stock would be a
good investment for Signal at a price as high as twenty-four dollars per
share. 59 After a discussion of the report, Signal's executive committee 60
recommended acquiring the balance of UOP stock for twenty to twenty-
one dollars per share. 61 The committee, relying in part on the Arledge-
Chitiea report and the oversubscription of the 1975 tender offer, author-
ized its management to negotiate a proposal for the acquisition of the mi-
53. Immediately prior to the Signal tender offer, UOP stock was trading at less than $14
per share on the New York Stock Exchange.
54. UOP's board had a total of 13 directors.
55. Five of Signal's appointees were directors or employees of Signal. The sixth was a
long time associate of Signal.
56. Crawford was senior vice president of a wholly-owned subsidiary of Signal and was
made a Signal director shortly after his appointments as UOP president, chief executive
officer, and director.
57. Arledge was vice president-director of planning at Signal, as well as a member of
the Signal board.
58. Chitiea was senior vice president-chief financial officer at Signal, as well as a mem-
ber of the Signal board.
59. Signal's return on the $24 per share investment was calculated by Arledge and Chi-
tiea to be 15.7%. In addition to an excellent return on investment, the Arledge-Chitiea re-
port outlined numerous other advantages of the acquisition, including increased earnings,
more efficient flow of resources between Signal and its subsidiaries, cost savings potential,
facilitation of technological exchange among Signal's subsidiaries, and elimination of poten-
tial conflicts of interest.
60. Before the Mar. 6, 1978, Signal board meeting, Crawford and Walkup discussed the
price offered the minority shareholders. Crawford, as UOP president, suggested the $21 per
share figure would be required to obtain UOP board approval.
61. Although Crawford was not a member of the Signal executive committee, he was
summoned by the committee to discuss the Signal-UOP merger. Before the meeting Shum-
way and Walkup sought Crawford's reaction to the $20-$21 offer. Crawford agreed that the
price was fair and voiced objections only to the effect of the merger on UOP personnel.
After receiving assurances that UOP's management would not be displaced by the merger,
Crawford agreed to submit the proposal to the UOP board and shareholders for approval.
[Vol. 37
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nority shares.62  Signal issued two press releases 63 announcing the
proposed merger and the current state of negotiations.
On March 6, 1978, the Signal and UOP boards met simultaneously by
teleconference to consider the proposed merger. Walkup and Crawford
attended the UOP meeting to explain the proposal and answer any ques-
tions from UOP board members. After Signal had approved the merger at
twenty-one dollars per share,64 the proposal was presented to the UOP
directors for consideration and approval. The packets of information pro-
vided to the UOP directors included a copy of the proposed merger agree-
ment, the fairness opinion rendered by Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc.,
UOP financial data for 1974 through 1977, and other market and budget
statistics. The Arledge-Chitiea feasibility study was not included.65 Based
on the information made available to it, the UOP board voted unani-
mously to adopt the Signal merger proposal. 66 On March 7, 1978, UOP
notified its shareholders of the UOP and Signal boards' action.67 The no-
tice and proxy statement mailed to the shareholders contained an endorse-
ment of the proposed merger by the UOP board and urged shareholder
support. The proxy also included a brief explanation of how the twenty-
one dollar price was determined 68 and referred to the favorable opinion
prepared by Lehman Brothers.69 On May 26, 1978, the UOP shareholders'
annual meeting convened. Only 51.9% of the minority shareholders voted
62. No negotiations took place. Crawford's activities as UOP president after the Signal
executive committee meeting consisted of contacting UOP's outside directors to explain the
status of the merger and retaining Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. to render a fairness
opinion. As a result of the reactions of the independent board members, Crawford informed
Walkup that a price offer of $21 per share was required to obtain UOP board approval. At
no time did Crawford or any other representative of UOP bargain with Signal for more than
$21 per share.
Lehman Brothers was allowed only three business days to render its opinion. As a result
of its hurried, and questionably accurate, opinion Lehman Brothers was originally a party to
this action. The plaintiffs, however; dropped Lehman Brothers from the suit on appeal and
therefore the issues raised by its actions are not discussed in the supreme court opinion.
63. The press release of Feb. 28, 1978, specifically referred to "negotiations" between
Signal and UOP. The second press release announced Signal's intent to offer between $20
and $21 per share and referred to the earlier statement regarding negotiations.
64. The terms of the proposal approved by Signal required that a majority of the UOP
minority shares approve the merger and that at least two-thirds of all UOP shares, inclusive
of Signal's shares, vote in favor of the merger.
65. Both courts found that the Arledge-Chitica report, prepared by UOP directors for
the exclusive use of the Signal leadership, was never made available to the non-Signal UOP
board members. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 707 (Del. 1983).
66. Only the independent board members voted on the proposal, but the minutes re-
flected approval of the merger by all UOP board members.
67. The letter reiterated the Feb. 28, 1978, press release announcement of negotiations
between Signal and UOP.
68. The proxy stated, in part: "'The price was determined after discussions between
James V. Crawford, a director of Signal and Chief Executive Officer of UOP, and officers of
Signal which took place during meetings on February 28, 1978, and in the course of several
subsequent telephone conversations.' " Id. at 708 (emphasis added by court). The word
"discussions" was substituted for the original word "negotiations" to avoid explaining the
extent of negotiations to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
69. Neither the short timeframe nor the manner in which the Lehman Brothers report
was prepared were disclosed in the proxy statement.
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for the merger,70 but in combination with Signal's holdings the total of
76.2% surpassed the minimum two-thirds stockholder approval required
under the merger proposal.
Shortly after the stockholders approved the merger, Weinberger filed a
class action suit on behalf of the minority stockholders against UOP, Sig-
nal, Lehman Brothers, the board of UOP, and the board of Signal.7 1 The
plaintiffs presented four major contentions to the Delaware Chancery
Court.72 First, the plaintiffs alleged that Signal had breached its fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders by unfairly using its control over UOP to
cash-out the minority interests without a legally proper purpose, and at a
grossly inadequate price. Second, the plaintiffs charged that the defend-
ants had misrepresented the true method by which the price had been es-
tablished, both in its proxy statement and press releases, thereby nullifying
the effectiveness of the merger approval vote. Third, the plaintiffs alleged
that the majority had breached its duty to the minority by failing to negoti-
ate for a higher price and by failing to take full account of the value of the
UOP shares. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the full, fair value for the
UOP shares was twenty-six dollars per share.
A comparison of the Delaware Chancery Court decision with the Dela-
ware Supreme Court decision is a study in contrasts. The chancery court
attempted to extend and to clarify the doctrines announced in the Singer73
and Tanzer 74 decisions. The supreme court in Weinberger, demonstrating
its strong dissatisfaction with the vague business purpose test it had
promulgated in Singer, broke with precedent and strove to establish a
more objective standard to evaluate the fairness of mergers. 75
70.
% of
Shareholder Shares % Minority
Signal 5,800,000 50.5
Minority for merger 2,953,812 25.7 51.9
Minority against merger 254,840 2.2 4.5
Minority not voting 2,479,650 21.6 43.6
Total 11,488,302 100.0% 100.0%
71. The original complaint failed to carry the burden of demonstrating unfairness and
was dismissed. An amended complaint, alleging specific facts giving rise to fraud, misrepre-
sentation, and misconduct was accepted, but the chancellor limited the class of plaintiffs to
those shareholders who did not ratify the merger at the May 26, 1978, shareholders' meeting.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed this limitation of the plaintiffs' class and expanded
the class to include all of UOP minority shareholders at the time of the merger. Weiss, The
Law of Take Out Mergers. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L.
REV. 245, 246 n.12 (1983).
72. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1340-41 (Del. Ch. 1981).
73. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
74. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
75. Weinberger specifically overturned the business purpose requirement of Singer and
its progeny. 457 A.2d at 704.
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A. The Chancery Court Decision
The chancery court entered judgment for the defendants. 76 The vice-
chancellor discussed Singer and its progeny at length, specifically identify-
ing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. 77 as the pillar of all later decisions in
the area because Sterling established the majority's burden of demonstrat-
ing the "entire fairness" of the transaction. 78 This burden does not arise,
however, until after minority shareholders object to the merger and pres-
ent specific proof of its unfairness.79 According to the chancery court,
Singer extended the fairness standards established in Sterling to cash-out
mergers such as the one involved in Weinberger.80 The court thus held
that a valid business purpose was a prerequisite to proving the fairness of a
cash-out merger. 81 In addition, the bona fide business purpose of the ma-
jority must, under Tanzer, extend beyond mere elimination of the minority
shareholders. 82 The court therefore read Tanzer as including the purpose
of the merger as an element in assessing the fairness of the merger under
the standards enunciated in Sterling.83 The court found, however, that
Signal had used the merger to effectuate the legitimate business purpose of
high yield investment. 84
In arguing that the defendants had misrepresented the means by which
the merger price had been determined, the plaintiffs contended that "com-
plete candor" was the applicable standard for evaluating information re-
vealed to all stockholders.85  The court agreed that this was the
76. 426 A.2d at 1363.
77. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
78. 426 A.2d at 1344.
79. Id. at 1345. The court cited the Singer line of authority as support for this proposi-
tion and erected a protective barrier for defendants by placing the initial burden on the
plaintiff to make a prima facie case before forcing the defendant to prove fairness. Id. at
1345-46; see David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(plaintiff must show fraud or something akin to fraud); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n,
18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183, 187 (Ch. 1931) (plaintiff must plead fraud in order to enjoin
merger).
80. 426 A.2d at 1346; see City of Coral Gables v. Weksler, 164 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (Singer-like standard applied to conflict of interest in public domain);
Southdown, Inc. v. McGinnis, 89 Nev. 184, 510 P.2d 636, 640 (1973) (fair cash value for
minority shareholders' interest); Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147,
150 (1964) (fairness is fair market value).
81. 426 A.2d at 1346; see Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del.
1981) (citing Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1962), and stating
that where "stock purchase occurs in the context of a tender offer, the directors have an
inherent conflict of interest" and the burden to justify the purchase as primarily in the cor-
porate interest); Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 61 Hawaii 622, 607 P.2d 1036, 1045-47 (1980)
(adopted business purpose test for merger evaluation). But see Deutsch v. Blue Chip
Stamps, 116 Cal. App. 3d 18, 172 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (1981) (statute permitting 90% cash-out
preempts Singer business purpose language); Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 422
A.2d 311, 320 (1979) (discussed but did not follow Singer's business purpose rule); Gabhart
v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977) (disagreeing with Singer's "entire fair-
ness" doctrine).
82. 426 A.2d at 1346.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1350.
85. The plaintiffs relied on Lynch v.Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
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appropriate standard, but concluded that the majority's representations
were adequate. 86 The court found that the "discussions" between UOP
and Signal were, in fact, "negotiations" and that the press releases refer-
ring to "negotiations" were therefore not misleading. 87
The court next rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the defendants had
breached the fiduciary duty they owed to the minority shareholders. 88 The
court focused on the status of the minority board members as experienced
businessmen, the relation between market price and the price offered the
minority shareholders in the merger,8 9 and other factors that indicated that
twenty-one dollars could be a fair price per share.90 The court ignored the
placing of Signal personnel in vital positions within the UOP organization
and the intracompany negotiation that had occurred between Crawford as
president of UOP and his co-directors at Signal. The court also ignored
the feasibility report prepared by Signal members of the UOP board.
Finally, the court examined the valuation process used by the experts for
the parties. The plaintiffs' expert, using the expanded remedies made
available by the Delaware Supreme Court,9' valued the UOP stock at ap-
proximately twenty-six dollars per share.92 The plaintiffs contended that
these expanded appraisal methods were essential to preserve the viability
of suits of this type. The plaintiffs pointed out that statutory appraisal 93
was always available to a cashed-out minority and that broader remedies
should thus be available to minority shareholders in suits for breach of
fiduciary duty.94 The court, however, questioned the validity of the plain-
tiffs' financial analysis and chose instead to follow the "Delaware Block"
or weighted average method of valuation used by the defendants' ex-
86. 426 A.2d at 1351-53.
87. Id at 1352.
88. Id at 1353, 1355. The court found this argument to be the strongest aspect of the
plaintiffs' case. Id. at 1353-56.
89. The 1975 tender offer of $21 per share was made when UOP stock was trading at
just below $14 per share. The 1978 tender offer of $21 per share was announced when UOP
stock was trading at $14.50 per share.
90. Id at 1354-55. The court focused on certain valuation calculations that are com-
pletely divorced from the core issues of fairness and fiduciary duty. Id For a general
discussion of valuation, see B. MELCHER, STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY, PART 1 (1973).
91. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 504-06 (Del. 1981); see supra notes
49-50 and accompanying text.
92. In reaching this figure plaintiffs expert used the discounted cash flow method of
valuation and a comparative analysis that examined premium over market paid within simi-
lar timeframes for 100% mergers and acquisitions over $100,000,000. Based on 10 compara-
ble transactions the expert compared market price per share before the announced merger
with the tender offer price. Adjusting for "noise" variables, the expert calculated premium
paid, on a percentage basis, to acquire 100% control. He found the median premium to be
74%; therefore, a price to UOP minority shareholders of $25.65 to $27.30, based on a Feb.
28, 1978, closing price of $14.75 per share, was necessary to achieve a premium of 70-80%.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982).
94. Statutory appraisal, when applied to breach of duty cases as interpreted before
Weinberger, did not account for lost future value of the cashed-out shares, thus making
breach of fiduciary duty case remedies utilizing the Delaware Block method of valuation
identical to those in simple appraisal cases.
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perts.95 The court indicated that it opposed the extension of remedies96
beyond the statutory appraisal available to stockholders.
B. The Delaware Supreme Court Decision
The Delaware Supreme Court broke sharply with precedent in reversing
the chancery court decision, establishing a new standard of fiduciary duty
between shareholders, and reformulating the damage measures available
for a breach of that duty. Initially, the court stated that the primary issue
in the case was the exclusive use of the Arledge-Chitiea feasibility study by
Signal.97 The court found that Signal's exclusive use of the report raised
fiduciary duty problems because the Signal directors participated on the
UOP board without full disclosure of the content of the report or of the
potential conflict of interest inherent in sitting on both sides of such a
transaction. 98 The court suggested that where such a conflict exists, the
interests of the minority shareholders should be represented by an in-
dependent negotiator.99
The court expanded upon the type of behavior required of majority
shareholders in such a situation. The court stated that Delaware law had
historically required a majority to act with "complete candor" toward mi-
nority shareholders.l°° Under this standard board members are not only
required to refrain from conduct that would be injurious to the minor-
ity, 1 1 but must also take affirmative steps, such as disclosure of germane
information, 10 2 to protect the minority. Directors who hold dual board
memberships owe a fiduciary duty to both corporations and, similarly, par-
ent corporations owe a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders of their
subsidiaries. 0 3 If in either case the minority shareholders are not repre-
95. 426 A.2d at 1357-62. The "Delaware Block" valuation method is a weighted aver-
age valuation using assets, market price, earnings, and other elements of value. Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983); see In re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 29 Del.
Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6, 14-15 (Ch. 1947). This method yielded a price between $19.86 and
$20.69 per share as fair to the minority shareholders.
96. 426 A.2d at 1359. The chancery court saw the plaintiffs' attempt to structure alter-
native remedies to statutory appraisal as illogical and against existing law. Id. at 1360.
97. 457 A.2d at 708. The court found overwhelming evidence that the Arledge-Chitiea
feasibility study and the information regarding the profitability of the UOP acquisition was
never disclosed to the independent directors of UOP. Id. at 708-09.
98. Id. at 709.
99. Id at 709 n.7; see Harriman v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133,
154 n. 117 (D. Del. 1975). The Weinberger court equated fairness to an independent board
acting in the interests of all of the corporation's stockholders. Furthermore, in the parent-
subsidiary context a demonstration of arms-length bargaining is required to prove fairness.
457 A.2d at 710 n.7.
100. Id at 710 (quoting Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977));
see Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
101. 457 A.2d at 710 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup.
Ct. 1939)). The court stated that there are no "safe harbors" for the divided loyalties exhib-
ited by Signal. 457 A.2d at 710.
102. Germane information means that information "a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock." Id. at 710.
103. Id (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 110
(Sup. Ct. 1952); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), affd, 278 A.2d
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sented by an independent negotiator, the duty of the board member or the
parent corporation is to act in the best interest of both corporations. 104
The court reaffirmed its holding in Gottlieb and Sterling that such board
members have the burden of establishing the "entire fairness" of the
transaction. 105
The court held that there are two interrelated components of fairness:
fair price and fair dealing. 106 Fair dealing is the requirement of complete
candor 10 7 that precludes a shareholder, director, or manager with superior
information from misleading shareholders not privy to that informa-
tion.'08 The court held that Signal's exclusive use of the Arledge-Chitiea
study failed to meet this standard, not only because the information had
been withheld from UOP, but also because Signal had obtained it through
its representation on the UOP board. 10 9 The court further stated that this
disparate bargaining position, coupled with the lack of any true negotia-
tions between Signal and UOP, precluded the contention that any reason-
able concept of fair dealing had been satisfied, 110 and characterized
Signal's actions instead as "wholly flawed."'I The court concluded that
an informed minority with access to the Arledge-Chitiea study or informa-
tion about other important aspects of the transaction might have voted
differently on the merger, thus rendering the prior vote meaningless. 112
Turning to the issue of fair price, the court balanced the defendants'
narrow reading of the appraisal statute 1 3 against the plaintiffs' prayer for
a liberalized remedy for breach of fiduciary duty.' 14 The court conceded
467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch.
1968)).
104. 457 A.2d at 711 (citing Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487 (Sup.
Ct. 1966)).
105. 457 A.2d at 710 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d
107, 110 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57, 57-
58 (Sup. Ct. 1952)). The court also noted, however, that if the corporate action has been
approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority. 457 A.2d at 703. The
court found that the minority vote here had not been an informed one. ld
106. Id at 711.
107. Id (citing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)).
108. 457 A.2d at 711 (citing Lank v. Steiner, 43 Del. Ch. 262, 224 A.2d 242, 244 (Sup. Ct.
1966)).
109. 457 A.2d at 711.
110. Id; see Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct.
1950); Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674, 676
(1979).
111. 457 A.2d at 712. The court also indicated that Signal had misrepresented the Leh-
man Brothers' fairness opinion as objective and carefully prepared, when in fact the report
was hurriedly prepared by a long-time associate of Signal. Id The plaintiffs dropped Leh-
man Brothers from the suit shortly before reargument before the supreme court. The court
did not, therefore, address Lehman Brothers' duty in the transaction. Id at 703 n.3.
112. Id at 712; see Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977); Cahall
v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 A. 224, 234 (Ch. 1921).
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982).
114. 457 A.2d at 712; see, e.g., F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS § 7.13 (1975); Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 674 (1979); Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standards of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Dela-
ware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44 (1977).
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that the Delaware Block method of valuation, which the chancellor had
employed to appraise the value of the UOP stock, had been used for many
years in Delaware, but found it "clearly outmoded" to the extent that it
precluded the use of other methods of valuation." 15 In place of the Dela-
ware Block method of valuation, the court expanded the means of valua-
tion to encompass "any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissi-
ble in court." '" 6 This liberalized approach permitted consideration of all
relevant indices of fair value while leaving the court in control of the ulti-
mate valuation method in individual cases." 17
The court concluded that the legislative intent underlying the evolution
of the appraisal statute supported its approach. 118 The court noted that the
current statute stresses judicial consideration of all relevant factors in de-
termining fair value," 19 while earlier versions of the statute had not men-
tioned fairness 120 or had merely alluded to it in general terms.121 Thus the
Weinberger court's consideration of elements of future value and the na-
ture of the enterprise 122 were intended to fulfill the legislative goal of fully
compensating cashed-out shareholders by considering a broad spectrum of
stock value indices. 123 The court further held that the broad remedies it
had established were not limited to monetary damages, 124 but also allowed
rescission or any other appropriate form of equitable or monetary relief.125
115. 457 A.2d at 712. The court declared that the standard Delaware Block or weighted
average method of valuation "shall no longer exclusively control" appraisal proceedings.
Id. at 712-13.
116. Id at 713.
117. Id at 712-13; see also Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 101, 66 A.2d 910,
917-18 (Ch. 1949) (many value factors must be considered in determining fair cash-out
price), rev'd on other grounds, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
118. 457 A.2d at 713.
119. Id DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1982) states:
After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the Court shall
appraise the shares, determining theirfair value exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger, together
with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into
account all relevant factors.
Id. (emphasis added).
120. See id. § 262 (1975).
121. See id. (as amended 1976).
122. 457 A.2d at 713. Consideration of these factors is unique in merger law, and they
were previously excluded in Delaware under the Singer approach. Id. at 713-14.
123. Id. at 714; see In re Burton Coal Co., 126 F.2d 447, 448 (7th Cir. 1942) (value of
securities is market value of stock in creditor claim); Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 365
Mo. 1124, 293 S.W.2d 429, 433 (1953) ("value" is an abstract concept representing a flexible
standard for fixing value between parties, considering assets, earnings, dividends, manage-
ment, and "[elvery relevant fact and circumstance which enters into the value of corporate
property and which reflects the value of corporate stock").
124. 457 A.2d at 714. The court, therefore, rejected the exclusive monetary relief
formula it had utilized in Lynch less than two years before. 1d; see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
125. 457 A.2d at 714; The court recognized that when as a result of a merger the compa-
nies' assets are so intertwined as to prevent rescission, the only practical remedy will be
monetary damages. [d
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Finally, the Weinberger court addressed the business purpose rule. The
court noted that the rule was a departure from prior case law 126 and ob-
served that the rule provided little protection to minority shareholders
since it could be "interpreted out of existence."' 27 The court therefore
eliminated the business purpose rule, relying on the total fairness concept
and the expanded remedies that it had made available to guide the lower
courts in the protection of minority shareholder interests in cash-out
mergers. ' 28
IV. CONCLUSION
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. the Delaware Supreme Court restructured
the methods of determining the fairness of a merger to the cashed-out mi-
nority by replacing the business purpose rule with an integrated system
testing fair price and fair dealing. The dual fairness measures, fair price
and fair dealing, address the central issues in a cash-out merger. Fair deal-
ing balances the fiduciary duty of the majority stockholder against his in-
terest in voting his shares in his own best interest. The Singer decision
signalled increased judicial concern for the results of liberalized merger
statutes.' 29 The response after Singer was a reinstatement of every share-
holder's right to receive full value for his investment. Like the Guth deci-
sion, Weinberger defines a strict fiduciary duty that requires directors to
execute their duties in the best interests of their corporations. If directors
are members of both parent and subsidiary corporations, they must act on
each board as if that corporation's best interests were the directors' sole
focus. Under the Weinberger decision, every shareholder has the right to
expect and receive the best efforts of the members of the board of directors
in the faithful conduct of the corporation's business. 130 Nevertheless, the
precise nature of the fiduciary duty of majority to minority still contains
gray areas to be addressed by courts in the future.
The Weinberger decision does not grant shareholders quasi-property
rights in their participation in the ongoing corporate entity. The Delaware
Supreme Court merely guarantees shareholders a fair price for cashed-out
shares. '3' The approach taken by the court in effect amended the Dela-
ware Block valuation method to include the future potential profitability
and value of the cashed-out stock, exclusive only of value directly related
to the merger. Consequently, although cash-out mergers deprive the mi-
nority of future participation in the corporate entity, the new appraisal
126. Id. at 715. The business purpose rule broke from the line of cases including Stauffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962), and David J. Greene &
Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
127. 457 A.2d at 715 (quoting Weiss, supra note 3, at 671 n.300). Weiss suggests that the
rhetoric of Tanzer and Singer should be replaced by the straightforward entire transaction
equity language of Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). Weiss,
supra note 3, at 671 n.300.
128. 457 A.2d at 715.
129. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
130. 457 A.2d at 711-12.
131. Id at 712-14.
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remedy gives the shareholder. the return he reasonably anticipated on his
investment. The broad language of the decision encourages inventive
methods of proof of the true value of the shares, 32 although the court
retains ultimate control of the valuation of the cashed-out shares. 133 Be-
cause the new standards were presented in broad terms, future courts may
apply the concepts announced in Weinberger to all mergers. In any event,
the widespread influence of the Delaware Supreme Court will likely initi-
ate a reevaluation of merger policies by the courts of other major commer-
cial states.
Kevin William Parke
132. The court stated, "[w]e believe that a more liberal approach must include proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community. ... Id at 713 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
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